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COMMENTARY ON THE LIMITS OF
COMPENSATION AND DETERRENCE IN
LEGAL REMEDIES
WILLIAM T. ALLEN*
I
INTRODUCTION
The subject of this symposium, corporate misconduct and the legal system’s
potential to deter it, is a matter of substantial importance. Regularly, if not
daily, print and broadcast journalists report violations of legal norms by business corporations that affect thousands of persons. If the savings and loan industry debacle was the most painful example of widespread business miscon1
duct that caused public as well as private injury, the emerging healthcare
industry problems with illegal side payments to physicians appear to be the
2
most recent. Problems of systematic corporate violation of legal norms have
public significance in large part because of the scale of the operations of the
modern publicly financed corporation. Much of our economic production
occurs within the corporate form of organization. We are naturally concerned
that legal rules designed to protect private rights and public health, safety, and
welfare be observed as these organizations function to produce wealth. Thus, it
seems quite natural for us to consider the deterrence effects that our system of
rules and remedies create. As this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems
demonstrates, the deterrence of rule violations is, however, not entirely simple.
I welcome the invitation to comment upon the scholarly papers of Profes3
sors James Cox and Deborah DeMott. Their thoughtful articles richly reward
the attention of their readers. But before I make any comment directed specifically to those papers, I first offer some more general comments on the topic
of deterrence.
Questions raised by the subject of appropriate deterrence of corporate misconduct may sensibly be sorted into two broad classes. The first class of quesCopyright © 1997 by Law and Contemporary Problems
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.
* Professor of Law, New York University; Professor of Business, Leonard N. Stern School of
Business; Director, NYU Center of Law & Business; Chancellor, Court of Chancery of the State of
Delaware, 1985-97.
1. See, e.g., S & L Mess, The End is Near. At Last. Maybe., TIME, Mar. 29, 1993, at 15.
2. See, e.g., Jill Smolowe, Healthy, Wealthy and Fraudulent, TIME, Aug. 30, 1993, at 24; The Medicare Grifters, TIME, July 13, 1992, at 20.
3. James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Autumn 1997); Deborah A. DeMott, Organizational Incentives to Care About
the Law, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 (Autumn 1997).
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tions is not restricted to corporate behavior but deals with deterrence by the legal system of rule violations generally. Included in this branch of our inquiry
would be such general questions as why we believe, if we do, that deterrence of
rule violation is a social good; how do we know what steps are appropriate to
achieve deterrence; and, most fundamentally, how do we determine what, with
respect to every rule we seek to enforce, is our deterrence objective? In other
words, the questions focus on what constitutes optimal deterrence?
The second class of issues focuses on the unique aspects of the deterrence
problem when we seek to deter not a human actor but a complex firm. Questions falling within this class interest us for reasons both of practicality and of
theory. They are practically important because a dominant part of our productive assets and our economic activity occurs within the corporate form. Therefore, because we seek to have these organizations advance rather than retard
public efforts to regulate human health, safety, and welfare, we seek to deter
their violation of legal rules.
The corporate form, like any complex organization, raises special questions
when we ask about deterrence of rule violations. Those special questions arise
from the presence of the so-called agency problem within the firm: That is, the
effects of having information and control over corporate property and processes in the hands of persons whose economic interests in the enterprise diverge to some extent from those of the residual claimants to the firm’s revenue,
its shareholders. The issues that fall within this class of inquiry include basic
questions such as why we should seek to deter corporations instead of, or in
addition to, trying to deter the human actors who violate rules. In other words,
why do we have vicarious liability? If we seek to affect corporate conduct
through corporate level sanctions for rule violation, what legal test ought we
employ to determine when a corporation will be liable for the acts of its agents?
The contributions of Professors Cox and DeMott fall within the second and
more strictly legal institutional class of questions. In commenting briefly on the
subject of deterring corporate misconduct, I want, however, to begin with the
first class of more general questions, most centrally what could we mean by optimal deterrence. This is because I believe that the concept of optimal deterrence should provide the essential backdrop for our thinking about deterrence
policy in our law. Thus, it is important to try to define and apply it notwithstanding the very substantial difficulty that task entails. The second part of my
comments will deal more specifically with the interesting contributions of Professors Cox and DeMott.
II
DETERRENCE IN A LEGAL SYSTEM
Our legal system performs a large number of functions. At a very high level
of generalization, we might characterize those functions as falling within four
general areas. First, the legal system provides a method to determine the
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authenticity or authority of statements that purport to constitute legal rules.
This function authorizes the process of the positive creation of legal rules or
codes, and establishes standards for authenticating positive legal rules of all
sorts. Second, the legal system facilitates social interaction and economic production by defining rights and establishing procedures by which people can
voluntarily create rights and duties and affect legal status. Thus, for example,
the law defines the acts necessary to constitute a valid will, a valid contract, a
valid marriage, or a valid transfer of property rights. Third, the legal system
enforces legal duties through criminal and civil processes, fixing and enforcing
compensation for some losses caused by violations of legal duties and prosecuting and punishing violators of criminal law. Fourth, in authoritatively announcing and enforcing legal norms, the legal system contributes to the construction of a social identity of the people who identify with it (or commit their
allegiance to it), thus tending to shape their behavior non-coercively.
Deterrence is one aspect of the enforcement function of the legal system.
To the extent that rules and remedies can be formulated in a way that accomplishes optimal deterrence, the more costly means of ex post enforcement of
rules can be avoided.
A. Optimal Deterrence
A concept of optimal deterrence is central to our intelligent design of
remedies for violations of legal duties. But how do we fashion such a concept?
When we ask what our concept of optimal deterrence is, we are, in effect, asking about our ideal of legal compliance. If our ideal world is one in which all
legal rules are always voluntarily obeyed, then we have implicitly adopted a
concept of optimal deterrence as that level of deterrence that causes all legal
obligations to be voluntarily respected.
To demonstrate that we ought not aspire to deter all rule violations, think
about the highly useful rule that provides that contracts validly made should
not be intentionally breached. As a hypothetical, consider now that, in some
other legal world, the remedy for intentional failure or refusal to perform such
a contract is capital punishment. Even though the example strikes one as absurd, it is instructive. The substantive rule is certainly a good rule. It promotes
the general welfare by facilitating contracting, reliance, and economic activity
of all sorts. And the remedy, if effectively enforced, would almost certainly deter intentional breaches of contract. It is intuitively apparent, however, that
such a strict policy of deterring intentional breaches of contract is too much of a
good thing. But why? I suppose that we intuit that the remedy over-deters in
this instance because, first and foremost, we feel that the remedy lacks proportionality. While we want contracts to be performed we are not willing to insist
on such performance at the cost of human life. We value some things more
than the (large) marginal contribution to human welfare that enforcing con4. This logically essential feature of a legal system was aptly called the “Rule of Recognition” by
H.L.A. Hart. See HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994).
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tracts provides. Secondly, I think we intuit that even if human life were not involved (substitute the forfeiture of all of the promisor’s property for the death
penalty in the hypothetical), there still will be contract performances that we do
not want to coerce to this extent. If the promisor will lose more from performing his contract than the promisee will gain from it, why should the legal
system enforce this loss? The alternative technique of fully compensating the
promisee for his losses, including his expected profit on the transaction, if fea5
sible, seems intuitively superior. In other words, one ought not want to deter
this violation, only compensate for losses it occasions.
B. Human Welfare Goal of Law
If strict obedience to legal duty is not the highest value of the legal system,
what is? In the context of thinking about remedies, what is the standard to
which legal actors—policy makers, administrators, and judges—should look to
conceive of optimal deterrence? Any such ultimate value will, of course, have
to be expressed in a broad generalization. One may defensibly think of justice
as the ultimate legal system value. A concept of justice that would serve this
purpose necessarily would extend beyond compliance with law. It would include concepts of social justice, since the ultimate ends for which we organize
our society are to some extent exogenous to the legal system. The working out
of what justice was thought to require would constitute an ongoing community
self-reflection.
But justice seems to me a less useful description of the legal system’s ultimate aim than an alternative: the advancement of human welfare. This concept
is, of course, no more objective than is justice, and agreement on its meaning
too could only be achieved through an ongoing social construction process. But
human welfare seems to me a superior characterization of the major goal of our
legal system. It can incorporate the requirements of social justice, with a recognition of the important role that production of material goods can have on
the welfare of the population.
What constitutes human welfare is, of course, itself debatable. We need not
enter that debate now. It is enough to acknowledge the multifariousness of the
human welfare goal and to observe that obedience to rules of law is not the
whole of it. Thus, legal rules fashioned to address a particular context are often
adjusted when they are deployed in contexts in which values other than the one
that the rule sought to protect become implicated.
In our effort to reason about deterrence of legal wrongs, we can deploy the
concept of advancement of human welfare. I suggest as a working concept the
following: Optimal deterrence is that set of circumstances (substantive rules,
procedural devices, and legal system practices) that creates the best set of incentives for all citizens to act in ways that advance the general welfare. The
5. The intuition is, of course, premised on the idea that more wealth is socially preferable to less
wealth. With greater wealth, governmental redistributional schemes allow for the relief of more human suffering and the advancement of various aspects of human welfare.
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question thus becomes how do we know when the general welfare is advanced
by permitting a rule violation to occur (that is, by sanctioning it in a way that
rationally permits it to occur, as in our earlier efficient breach hypothetical)?
In making this determination, a fundamental distinction could be drawn between breaches that affect only personal property interests or expectations and
those that affect public interests, which may be more difficult to value.
C. Public Wrongs and Private Wrongs
In considering general legal system deterrence, and particularly deterrence
of corporate misconduct, it is helpful to divide legal rules, somewhat artificially,
into those protecting private interests and those protecting public interests. If
we at first limit our inquiry to the enforcement of rules that advance the general welfare through facilitation of private activity—such as rules enforcing
contracts, or protecting property interests—we find, I think, a rather plausible
proxy for the advancement of human welfare in the compensation concept and
the damage remedy. Of course, trying to value losses in monetary terms may
be problematic. The obvious example is pain and suffering. But the valuation
problem is inherent in any attempt to advance multiple values. In cases in
which rules designed to protect commercial interests are involved, however, the
market measure of value is certainly dependable. In that context, the compensation remedy has a strong claim to advance the general welfare. It does this by
permitting a socially beneficial breach to occur while fully compensating the
6
party to whom the legal duty was owed.
Thus, the garden variety remedy for violation of legal rights protecting a
private interest—monetary compensation for the amount of the loss proximately caused by the breach of duty—is not only capable of a substantial deterrent effect, but where there are no public costs associated with the breach, it
does so in an appropriately tailored way. The award of appropriate compensatory damages in a private wrong has two signaling effects. First, it signals to
strangers to the action that their own future violations of the rights of others
will result in their being forced to pay appropriate compensation. Second, it
signals that if the violation is itself value producing, the law will not foreclose
the realization of that net value.
What is notable about this inevitable deterrent effect of money damages is
that, in a world of perfect information and no transaction costs, it would approach our concept of optimal deterrence. In order for the compensatory remedy to constitute optimal deterrence, the following conditions would be required. First, it would be necessary that all costs associated with the breach of
duty are incurred by the parties to the suit. Second, a court or other agency
would have to be able to price correctly the losses arising from the breach, including the time value of money. Third, the breaching party would have to be

6. See generally 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.3 (1990).
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solvent and believe, at the time of the breach, it is capable of paying full damages.
Each of these conditions of an optimal compensation deterrent effect are,
of course, problematic in fact. Unpriced effects on others do frequently occur
even in apparently private suits. Full compensation of all injured parties is also
problematic. Limited information and human cognition mean that courts will
7
not always appropriately weigh the costs of a breach. The Texaco v. Pennzoil
case, with its breathtaking award of compensatory and punitive damages, was
only an astounding example, not a unique one, of the erratic quality of damage
awards. Moreover, transaction costs of adjudication will rationally foreclose
some claims from being asserted at all. Finally, while those costs will fall on
both sides of a dispute, the defendant who has breached a duty may impose uncompensated losses on the plaintiff by reason of the fact that the legal rate of
interest may be less than plaintiff’s cost of debt. If the interest rate is less than
defendant’s cost of debt, the defendant will have an incentive to impose this
cost on the plaintiff. In that event, the defendant will have a financial incentive
to delay the process of adjudication and the payment of the judgment.
Thus significant problems in the administration of the legal system mean
that the compensation remedy itself will fail to achieve optimal deterrence.
D. Correcting Under-Deterrence
Where corporate violators are involved, the most notable source of imperfections in the deterrent effect of the compensation remedy arises from the
collective action problems that occur in mass torts or other class injuries. These
problems are not a logical consequence of the corporate form, but are associated with the practical fact that mass torts arise most often from commercial activities conducted in the corporate form. The collective action problem is the
familiar one: A breach of a duty owed to a large class of people may result in
substantial collective loss but a loss to each class member that is too modest to
justify incurring the costs associated with establishing each injured person’s
right to compensation. Logically related to this problem is the problem of the
low visibility breach—that is, a breach of duty that is not easily detected. In
this circumstance, a rational defendant might calculate the benefits of breach
and weigh them against the present value of the probable amount of any compensation award discounted by the probability of discovery. There is no social
gain in a breach that benefits the breaching party only because he will not have
to pay full damages. Such a breach is inefficient (that is, making all of the same
assumptions about the absence of an effect on the public and the ability of
prices to reflect value accurately). Both of these situations—small individual
class claims and low visibility claims—represent important instances in which
the compensation remedy will under-deter wrongs.

7. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1989).
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E. Class-based Remedies
Two legal system institutions arguably help to move compensation toward
optimum deterrence: the class action and the institution of punitive damages.
Each, however, is a very imperfect means to move toward optimal deterrence.
The wide-spread adoption of the 1966 federal amendments to the class action
rule presents the most obvious and important example of a legal innovation
that has the effect of making the compensatory remedy a more effective deterrent. It does this by facilitating the inexpensive joinder of small claims, under
established circumstances, so as to make the adjudication of related claims of
breach of duty by a single defendant (or a set of defendants) economically feasible. As it becomes more feasible for classes of injured persons to seek judicial
redress, the incentive to infringe rights is reduced. Thus, the class action is the
preeminent innovation allowing the compensatory goal to serve the deterrent
function more effectively.
As is well understood, however, the class action suit itself suffers from substantial agency problems that are only partly mediated by the judicial supervi8
sory role in such suits. Academic commentary is one thing, but concern about
the problems of shareholder litigation go far wider than those academics expert
in the economic analysis of group action. Discussion is widespread in the press
and in legislatures of the agency problems of suits controlled not by the holders
of legal rights but by lawyers who will seek a fee typically thousands of times
larger than the award a class member may receive. Of course, such discussion
is irksome to members of the plaintiffs’ class action bar who regard themselves,
generally with reason, as principled and professional. Nevertheless, it seems
clear that the agency problems that arise in class actions limit the ability of such
suits to bring the compensatory function of civil litigation into alignment with
the deterrent aim of the law. Thus, an important question for improvement of
our systematic ability to achieve natural deterrence is whether there are
changes in the class action mechanism that may reduce agency costs of the suit.
Such changes could, of course, involve a large number of matters from the simple expedient of solving the collective action problem by auctioning the claim
to a single person or entity as Professors Macey & Miller have suggested, to
modifying pleading standards and settlement procedures. Professor Coffee has
what he calls a “bill of rights” for class members, including elections of repre9
sentation.

8. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for the Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
669, 677-84 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Role in Class
Actions and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 19-28 (1991).
9. See John C. Coffee, Testimony Before Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight of the
Courts, 1997 WL 683686, at *16 (Oct. 30, 1997).
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F. Punitive Damages
As important as class suits may be in trying to align damages with total loss
caused by the breach by aggregating the loss, they cannot optimally deter.
Consider the low-visibility breach. In the low-visibility breach, one who owes a
legal duty may be induced to violate the duty because there is a material chance
the breach will go undetected. Substitution of lower cost ingredients in a product or arranging for the payment of fiduciary funds in a way that gives to the
payor an extended use of the funds might constitute breaches that have a low
10
probability of detection. A rational defendant may be tempted to engage in
low-visibility breaches (especially if he or she is rationally unconcerned about
repeat business) because, if compensation is the sole remedy, the present value
of the breach will be (absent consideration of costs of suit) greater than the
present value of a probable judgment.
Punitive damages are one way in which a defendant may be deprived of expected gains from a breach in a low-visibility breach context, thus deterring
breaches. Consideration of the deterrent impacts of punitive damages is illuminating both in its similarities and its differences to the effects of the class action device. Punitive damages are not compensatory; they serve a deterrence
and a pedagogic function. Rationally, the prospect of punitive damages will
cause rational calculating actors to adjust upwardly the expected value of
judgment against himself and thus to reduce the net present value of the proposed breach. From a pedagogic perspective, punitive damages powerfully announce a community standard, and, by affixing a greater or smaller penalty for
its breach, they attempt to attribute some relative weight or importance to the
manner of its violation.
As all pedagogic functions of law, punitive damages have a utilitarian and a
non-utilitarian aspect. In its utilitarian aspect, punitive damages can have the
effect, like class action judgments, of moving a damage award toward a theoretically optimum level that would deter rational violators. Punitive damages
seem superior to the class action with respect to deterrence in one respect: Punitive damages, since they are for all practical purposes without an upper
11
limit, are capable of removing from the breaching party the prospect of any
profit from the breach, and of visiting upon the breaching party a substantial
loss arising from the breach. In principle, the strictly compensatory class action
12
is not capable of this result.
But what is particularly notable about punitive damages is not simply the
ability of the device to deter, but also the unpredictability of its deployment by
juries. In charging juries to consider the appropriateness of an award of puni10. See, e.g., Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 681 A.2d 1039, 1041-42 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1996).
11. But see BMW of N. America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996) (holding that there is some
constitutional protection against grossly excessive punitive damages). See generally Developments in
the Law—Jury Determination of Punitive Damages, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1997).
12. In fact, however, the calculation of compensatory damages in large class actions would be such
a complex and difficult process that the practical effect of the prospect of such an award might not be
so different from the effect of the threat of open-ended punitive damages.
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tive damages, courts do not attempt to guide them into some calculation designed to estimate the amount that would be appropriate to deter such conduct.
Rather, courts allow juries, as the delegated voice and conscience of the community, to make a direct expression of its reaction to the conduct of the defendant. How that judgment gets converted into dollars is largely an unexamined
13
and unguided process.
While punitive damages are capable of correcting for systematic underdeterrence, they do not do so optimally. They are capable of over-deterring. If
a rational or efficient breach entails some risk of an unknowable but large additional payment occasioned by the jury’s reaction to the breach, the number of
welfare-enhancing breaches of duty will decrease.
G. Optimal Deterrence of Invasions of Public Interests
Questions of optimal deterrence are even more complex when rights that
protect public interests are implicated. The problem of defining optimal deterrence remains the same; what is more difficult is affixing a value to the interests
that are impacted by the violation of duty. Where public regulation of health,
safety, and welfare are involved, the question of “efficient breach” is more difficult since information concerning the effects of the breach will be hard to estimate either ex ante by the rule formulator or ex post by the enforcement
agency or court. That does not mean that in this setting optimal deterrence is a
condition in which no violations occur. It remains the case that complex human
welfare is the goal we should seek to advance and not blind obedience to an ex
ante pronouncement.
Consider an example of public regulatory deterrence, the regulation of air
pollution. Let us consider the matter at the point that the regulator had formulated a standard. Once the rule formulator has fixed a standard for
acceptable and unacceptable levels of a particular form of air pollution, that
standard must be observed by the regulated firms and enforced by the public
agency (or perhaps by “private attorneys general”). The standard with which
we wish people to comply should of course be stated as precisely as circumstances permit. Nevertheless, compliance with the standard will usually involve
judgments of probabilities that depend on a host of technological, environmental, or market variables. So while we would expect the air pollution standards to be expressed in some measurable terms—for example, parts per million of identified impurities released into the air—compliance with the standard
will inescapably involve judgment. Technological control mechanisms available to govern the emission process under varying environmental conditions

13. See EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 86.09 (1987)
(Model charge for punitive damages: “If you find that the acts of defendant were willful, wanton, and
maliciously done, then you may add to the actual amount of damages such amount as you shall agree is
proper. The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate plaintiffs, but to punish the defendant
and to deter defendant and others from committing such acts in the future.”).
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may be more or less imperfect and that fact will necessity judgments concerning
safety margins.
Designing a production process that will both advance the corporation’s
economic mission and assure compliance with the law will be problematic because of information and technology imperfections. Legal compliance, while
advancing the corporate purpose, will logically entail corporate agents making
a probabilistic assessment of the chances that any given set of production inputs
will give rise to some violation of the announced standard with some degree of
frequency. Consideration of the probabilities that a particular production plan
may cause a violation of the standard and how often that violation may occur
will be an inevitable part of the production planning process. The probability
of violating the standard can be reduced by adopting a set of production inputs
that stay very far away from inputs that would be optimizing from the point of
view of the firm if it were able to impose environmental damage without incurring costs. Such a strategy—wide margins of safety—may satisfy the corporation’s duty not to violate the standard, but it will not optimally advance human
welfare, since it will preclude some level of production that might have safely
been extracted from the system. Legally, the duty that this strategy will stress
is the director’s duty to the corporation and its shareholders. Management
does, of course, have a legal duty to advance the long-term financial interests of
the corporation and its shareholders. It may not be an available option, both as
a matter of legal duty and also as a matter of market competition, simply to set
the production process inputs at a level at which there is essentially no risk of
possible violation.
In principle, both the duty of legal compliance and of loyalty to the longterm financial interests of the investor may each be satisfied where information
is available that permits the corporation to price the cost to the corporation of
its occasional violations of the standard. In a world of complete information of
this type, the government would express the relative importance of compliance
by setting the price or penalty in advance for various types and frequencies of
violations. Such information would permit persons rationally to comply with
the standard in a way that is consistent with achievement of other human welfare-enhancing goals. The higher the price or penalty occasioned by the violation, the more care management will take to avoid that cost. With such information, management could calculate the profit from the transactions that risk
violation of the standard and weigh them against the fine that such conduct
would engender if the violation occurred (discounted, of course, by the risk of
violation). Management might have to add an estimate for other costs, if any,
but this system would permit a rational calculation respecting risks that would
permit the system to move toward the posited goal of optimizing human welfare.
In a world of complete information and fully effective legal mechanisms,
optimal deterrence would result in the occurrence of only those breaches of
duty that increase total production (measured in dollars) when the payment of
fully compensatory damages are counted as a production cost. Optimal, not
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perfect, deterrence thus understood is a worthy social goal. It would not, to any
extent, demean the public interest or glorify profit-making unduly. It simply
seeks increased rationality. Such a policy would place a burden on the formulator of a rule and its remedy to try, at the time of the promulgation of the rule,
to provide information concerning the rule’s importance.
The fundamental point is that, even in this hypothetical world of almost
perfect information, violations of the standard would exist because some violations will be value enhancing. At most levels of ex ante penalty, there will exist
some set of factors affecting the corporation’s decisions that would make a
14
probability of future non-compliance (at some frequency) optimal. If we assume that the ex ante penalty does correctly establish a social cost for such violation of the standard, then there is a social interest in having the firm adopt
that set of production inputs that will optimize the corporation’s financial performance even considering the possible violation of the standard.
Thus, where the penalty is strictly monetary, rational deterrence of violations and public health, safety, and welfare regulation is possible in principle.
Where criminal law violations are involved, however, matters get even more
complicated. Criminal law, with its penal sanctions, cannot be (or at least are
not) dealt with by corporations or their management with the same calculus as
violations of civil rights. For good reason, corporate directors will not direct
management to calculate the costs and benefits of compliance with criminal
law. Nor will their lawyers advise them that they may safely do so. The pedagogic message of criminal sanctions is “take all necessary steps to avoid the
proscribed act.” Criminal remedies provide the strongest set of deterrence signals.
H. Institutional Competence
The formulation of a concept of optimal deterrence is a fundamental necessity in order rationally to analyze policy respecting deterrence of corporate or
any other misconduct. The concept that I find helpful—maximization of net
wealth—is not difficult in principle. Application of this principle, however,
would be exceptionally problematic in practice. It only works well if one as15
sumes that costs of the violation can be responsibly identified and estimated.
Obviously, obtaining or estimating such information is problematic. But the
difficulty of the task and the imperfection with which it can be done does not
justify avoiding grappling with it. All else is intuition. Intuition is of course in-

14. Non-compliance would also exist for the independent reason that, whatever the “price” for a
violation is, the probability that it will have to be paid is less than 100%. Therefore, rationally acting
officers may produce a less than optimum amount of compliance unless the regulators have successfully factored that fact into the establishment of the penalty or price in the first instance.
15. Where one is considering health, safety, and welfare legislation, the difficulty of that task derives from at least two problems: incomplete data with respect to the human health effects of given
levels of contamination or pollution and the absence of a clear standard to convert estimated health
impacts into dollars.
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evitable in the construction and operation of a legal system, but we ought to
strive for rationality and turn to intuition only when driven to it.
The definition of optimal deterrence requires rich specific information.
Thus a first step at thinking about construction of a legal regime that tends to
create rules and procedures that approach that ideal is to ask ourselves what institutional arrangements can best produce this result. One possibility is, of
course, that enforcement agencies, such as courts or administrative tribunals,
that would be only very broadly constrained, could ex post evaluate the conduct
in the context and establish an appropriate penalty for a breach of a public
duty. Such ex post remedy formulation would have a potentially huge informational advantage over an agency that created a penalty ex ante. They would
have better information about all of the factors surrounding the actual violation
of standards. For that reason, they may be in a superior position to estimate
the value of social harm occasioned by the violation. If the court could responsibly estimate the dollar value of that impact and impose it upon the defendant,
and the defendant could foresee that consequence then, from a pedagogic perspective, it will appropriately signal regard for the law.
There are substantial problems with this approach, however. Most importantly, it does not make clear information available to the regulated party at the
time it must choose its production inputs. Therefore, welfare-maximizing decisions could not be made ex ante. Second, a responsible estimation by a court of
the costs associated with a particular violation of the Clean Air Act, as in our
example, would be an extremely difficult and costly endeavor. While the court
(or any enforcement agency) acting ex post does have, in principle, an informational advantage over the ex ante rule formulator, the court has corresponding
disadvantages. First, it will have little expertise in estimating the necessary values, and speaking of courts at least, their processes are not well suited for such
large-scale questions. More importantly, the transaction costs associated with
repeated individual determinations of the social costs of violations would be
large, certainly far greater than a single administrative ex ante determination.
The advantages of having the agency that formulated the rule be the agency
that “prices” violations in order to deter violations optimally are powerful.
Most importantly, as a legislative or administrative body, its process can be
adjusted to consider a broader range of policy matters than can a court. Second, the agency’s opportunity for collecting information is greater, as are its resources, and it is not constrained by its own precedent. Third, in our legal tradition, the shaping of a penalty or fine has predominantly been seen as a
legislative function—not a judicial one. Fourth, the rule formulator may reverse its prior decisions with greater freedom than may a court, or indeed any
other ex post enforcer. Fifth, the rule formulator can shape a fine or penalty response that considers public policy in all of its myriad aspects.
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I. Summary Respecting the Pursuit of Optimal Deterrence in a Sub-Optimal
World
For these reasons, I believe that, when the liability rule that we seek to enforce through appropriate deterrence protects against a private loss, we ought
to provide compensatory remedies that offer a low cost means to determine
damage and award compensation. The class action should be that device, but
steps to moderate the agency problem inherent in its structure will have to be
taken before further progress can be made with respect to its use. Punitive
damages have certain advantages as a deterrent, but are in fact so imperfectly
controlled under existing law and practice that, as a legal system device, it is not
clear that punitive damages produce a net welfare gain or loss. The path of law
improvement, in my opinion, lies in fashioning appropriate devices to narrow
the circumstances in which a jury is authorized to punish in this way.
When the liability rule in question is designed to protect a public interest,
the fixing of an appropriate penalty only ex post deprives the regulated parties
of information sufficient to allow them to calculate what constitutes optimal
(wealth maximizing) behavior for themselves and thus deprives us all of the capacity to arrange affairs in a way that optimizes human welfare (on a special
but not indefensible set of assumptions that associates optimal human welfare
with optimal production of total wealth (so-called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
Therefore it is plausible that the more likely path toward optimal deterrence in
this setting is the expenditures of public resources at the outset sufficient to
create a set of specific penalties. While specific penalties would necessarily be
set forth in classes and thus the fines would not always perfectly match the expected cost of public injury done by the violation, such a technique would allow
the regulated to understand the consequences of their acts when they planned
their production inputs. In all events, it is important that our law and policy be
premised on an understanding that greater deterrence is not necessarily the
same thing as optimal deterrence. We need a theory to estimate optimal deterrence. Such a theory will allow us to view each substantive rule and its remedy
in a larger context before making a judgment about the rule’s appropriate sanction.
III
DETERRING CORPORATE RULE VIOLATIONS
With a general notion of the logical necessity and practical difficulty of the
concept of optimal deterrence in mind, let us turn to Professor Cox’s rewarding
contribution. It weaves together several distinct strands of law and policy into
an interesting engagement with the following question: How should and does
the corporate law achieve a useful deterrent effect respecting corporate viola16
tions of legal duties owed to others? I will limit my comments to his first
point, the role of vicarious liability in achieving appropriate deterrence. In that
16. See Cox, supra note 3, at 1.
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connection, I confess that I was not entirely persuaded by his defense of the
idea that a system of strict vicarious liability is likely to be preferable to a sys17
tem that has some elements of duty-based liability.
First, I want to note a fundamental: In considering deterrence, we are only
considering the calculating mind. To the extent people violate legal norms for
reasons having nothing to do with calculation (for example, crimes of passion),
deterrence is not an apt concept. I accept, however, that our legal system assumes that few rule violations are altogether free of every level of awareness of
consequence and choice. Thus, we suppose that calculation is very often present to some, not immaterial, extent and that, therefore, deterrence is an apposite concept when considering sanction for rule violation. Thus, Professor
Cox’s reminder that not all misconduct is calculated as an economist might
imagine is true, but not pertinent to his subject of deterrence. Generally, in
human action, that which can be deterred is the subject of some process of reasoning.
Second, in analyzing the place of vicarious corporate liability in a regime of
appropriate deterrence, Professor Cox accepts, but does not rely exclusively on,
what I take to be a standard economic interpretation of the place of vicarious
18
corporate liability in our scheme of rights and remedies. That view holds that,
in a world of perfect information and fully solvent human actors, there would
19
be no need for a regime of vicarious liability. Human actors would be responsible for paying full compensation from their own wealth for the injuries
20
proximately caused by their actions in breach of a legal norm. Given perfect
information, we would know ex ante how to sanction these wrongs so as to deter them to the optimal extent. In this hypothetical world, there is no need for
vicarious liability. (Indeed, we would count upon employee “agents” constraining the acts of the corporation because the employees’ own credit would
be at risk!)
We, of course, do not exist in this world of perfect information and universal solvency, and it is the ways in which the real world differs from this hypothetical one that makes vicarious corporate liability sensible social policy. Because it is empirically the case that corporate employers are more likely to have
greater assets than the individual agents they employ, the law will achieve a
closer matching of risk and reward associated with the joint economic activity
of the principal/agent if corporate employers/principals have control of both
employee/agents and liability for agent actions done to advance the joint or
corporate purposes. Employers will therefore tend to internalize the costs attendant to the joint activity (or firm activity).

17. See id. at 2-20.
18. See id. at 2-8.
19. See Reiner H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and The Cost of Legal Controls, 93
YALE L.J. 857, 859-69 (1984).
20. See id.
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This view accepts that the purpose of vicarious firm liability is to better
match risk and reward, which will tend to produce greater allocative efficiency.
But it leaves some important institutional questions open. Specifically, it does
not specify what legal test will be used to determine whether legal liability from
an act of an agent will cause liability to be shared by the firm. It is this subject
21
that generates a certain warmth from Professor Cox.
22
Third, the gist of the vicarious liability portion of Cox’s paper is a strong
disagreement with the work of Professor Jennifer Arlen and Professor Reinier
23
Kraakman concerning vicarious corporate liability. According to Cox, Professor Arlen has observed in the current system, which is characterized largely by
strict corporate liability for wrong done by employees within the scope of their
24
duties, what she characterizes as a perverse effect. We are told it is this: Strict
liability can create a disincentive to monitor corporate compliance with law because it has at least four possible effects. First, monitoring costs something.
Thus, in a rational world, whatever the benefits are hoped to be, they must exceed the expected cost in order for monitoring to occur. Second, monitoring
may decrease unlawful gains that would otherwise arise from violation of rules.
The idea here is that some agent misconduct must be beneficial to joint efforts
and, if agent compensation is incentive based, maybe a lot of such misconduct
has benefits to the firm. Third, monitoring will raise the probability of detection of wrongdoing and thus imposition of costs (fines or damages). Fourth,
monitoring may decrease exposure to adverse fines or damages because it may
decrease violations. The perverse effect is the third one.
These effects cut in different directions. Logic, of course, does not dictate
that the costs of monitoring plus the increased risk of fines, etc., will exceed the
decreased costs of fines actually incurred. Thus, the perverse effect Professor
Arlen first described does not preclude a corporation’s quite sensibly undertaking monitoring and compliance programs, as Professor Cox correctly reports
they are increasingly doing. But the fact that this monitoring activity may expose firms to a heightened risk of fine or damages nevertheless must logically
act as an impediment to investment in monitoring. Arlen and Kraakman ob25
serve that the risk is, by definition, magnified by a strict liability regime. They
recommend that this perverse effect be mitigated by the law adjusting a corporation’s exposure to liability where it has made a reasonable effort to inform,
26
monitor, and correct its agents. Their proposed alternative would, in some re27
spects, be a duty-based regime and, in others, a strict liability regime. They
21. See Cox, supra note 3, at 8-10.
22. See id. at 2-20.
23. For a glimpse of the Arlen-Kraakman views on vicarious corporate liability, see generally Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833
(1994); Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).
24. See Cox, supra note 3, at 11-12.
25. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 706-13.
26. See id. at 735-41.
27. See id.
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approve, in many ways, the Federal Organization Sentencing Guidelines as a
composite system of a type that they would endorse, but offer several specific
28
grounds for modifications in that approach.
Professor Cox is disapproving of this approach. He is concerned that it
would impose greater system costs by increasing uncertainty about liability
standards and that it would disserve justice because when the corporation had
appropriate monitor and control mechanisms in place, this standard would
permit corporations to escape liability for private losses caused by the corpora29
tion’s employees’ violation of law. His critique of Professor Arlen’s algebra
is, in effect, a quibble. The gist of the insight remains. So long as increased risk
of detection of wrongful conduct is linked to an increased risk of sanction, then,
regardless of all other factors, there exists a marginal disincentive to monitor.
It is not much of a criticism to say that the insight is only a model builder’s insight. That is, that it cannot tell you how practically important the effect noted
actually is in the world. One question that this observation raises is what, in the
world of real events, is the marginal effect of this disincentive? One’s intuition
is that in many situations, the benefits associated with deterring organizational
wrongdoing will be such as to dominate the disincentive effects, perhaps even
render them trivial. Moreover, Cox is correct in pointing out that minimizing
the combined costs of monitoring and sanctions is not the only reason that corporations have compliance programs. They have such programs in part because senior agents need information about the functioning of the organization
to control it (either for reasons that owners are monitoring them or because
they have financial and lawful incentives to do so). But that fact does not logically change the marginal effect of linking monitoring with the possibility of
greater sanctioning, that is, the perverse effect, even though it may reduce the
practical significance of the perverse incentive effect.
Professor Cox is concerned about the distribution effects of the ArlenKraakman approach. He foresees that the duty-based approach to corporate
liability would leave uncompensated in some cases persons injured by conduct
of corporate agents within their scope of employment. He cites the hypothetical case of a corporate treasurer who deliberately issues false statements in order to facilitate the corporation’s getting a bank loan. Under a duty-based system he wonders whether a buyer of the company’s stock who relied on that
misstatement and who was injured when the truth emerged would be able to be
made whole by the corporation. If the corporation could show that it had behaved reasonably would it not be free of liability under Arlen & Kraakman’s
conception and is this not plainly wrong?
Well to this writer at least, it is not so clear what is appropriate social policy
with respect to this hypothetical. At common law there would have been no
corporate liability, of course, so if we intuit that that result might not be so horrific, we are not out of touch with our legal traditions. Of course, our traditions
28. See id. at 745-52.
29. See Cox, supra note 3, at 12-20.
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have evolved and it is the case that under Rule 10(b)(5) the issuer would be liable as the result of this false statement, with regard to monitoring efforts. If
we are asking ourselves what is the “just” solution to this problem, my own answer would take into account (1) the increasing role of large financial intermediaries in the purchase and sale of stock, (2) the diversified nature of most
stock investors (directly and indirectly), (3) the transaction (litigation) costs of
the rule adopted, and (4), most importantly, the expected consequences on issuers and buyers of stock of the liability rule I formulate. Considering those
factors I can only report that, if it were the conclusion that the corporation had
acted appropriately in establishing and monitoring its controls, it is not obvious
to me that a strict liability rule that required that the “defrauded” investors loss
be compensated by the other investors (that is, the corporation) is superior to
the duty alternative.
At the end of the day, Professor Cox argues that there will be greater uncertainty concerning liability standards and thus greater direct and indirect costs in
the system from the substitution of the ex post duty standard than is present in
the strict liability regime. For those that would advance the duty regime, those
costs are clearly present but they are likely to be outweighed by flexibility in
the definition of optimal deterrence that the duty-centered systems allow. As
in so very many areas of law criticism and law formulation, the answer to this
dispute does not lie in concepts alone. Rational policy can be made only if we
can have responsible, empirically based estimates of the costs and the benefits
of each approach. This is, of course, evident but needs to be stated and restated
as an encouragement to the gathering of facts.
I turn briefly to Professor DeMott’s interesting piece to make only two
comments. First, this scholar gives us a very powerful insight when she reminds
us just how dominating the corporate employer can be in the employer30
employee relationship. She does well to remind us that an employer may signal an attitude toward rules even while it announces a policy in favor of strict
compliance. She uses as an example Domino’s Pizza delivery persons who
were told to obey the traffic laws while making deliveries, while at the same
time they were told that they would have to pay for any pizzas they did not de31
liver within thirty minutes. While this example is helpful, I am not sure that
this is a strong argument supporting strict enterprise liability. In a duty-based
regime, the court would be required in determining whether there was a breach
of duty to determine whether the corporation had appropriately supervised the
employee. That determination would not, I am certain, be limited to formal
statements, but would necessarily consider all aspects of the relationship, most
certainly any incentive compensation scheme. Nevertheless, consideration of
this topic does begin to require one to think about what would be the level of
transaction costs entailed (that is, litigation costs) were one to move from a re-

30. See DeMott, supra note 3, at 55-56.
31. See id. at 45-46.
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gime of strict liability (within a broad agency model) to a duty or composite
model.
Second, Professor DeMott addresses the Caremark case in an intelligent
32
and insightful way. This topic leads her to suggest a modest and interesting
adaption. She suggests that if senior management is involved (not in a financially self-interested way, but in a hands-on manner) in a transaction that violates rules and causes loss, then, in a later shareholder action seeking to recover
corporate losses from the officer himself, the officer should have the burden to
33
establish the elements of the business judgment rule. The rationale for this
innovation is that it creates an enhanced but not draconian incentive on the
part of senior management to monitor compliance with law. In that event, I assume that such a director would be required to show that he had made a good
faith effort to be reasonably informed with respect to the matter and that he
exercised judgment in a good faith effort to advance the corporation’s interests.
Therefore, as Professor DeMott notes, a lot goes into one’s concept of good
34
faith.
The concept of good faith, which in my understanding of the fiduciary
duties of corporate directors is the central dominating idea of the field, is of
course problematic. How can courts tell when good faith is present, and do we
really want this area of the law governed essentially by the presence or absence
of a state of mind? It is particularly difficult when legal compliance is at issue
and the corporation may financially benefit from a violation. What does good
faith require of a director in that context? Surely, you might think that corporation law cannot encourage frank violations of the law by permitting indemnification when laws are knowingly and intentionally violated, even if the officer
who authorized the acts constituting the violation calculated that the benefit to
the corporation from the violation exceeded the expected value of the penalty
plus all costs associated with the violation. But what about our earlier hypothetical where a responsible calculation was made of the air pollution rules and
their penalties in picking a set of production inputs that risked some level of
occasional violation? When a violation occurs and the government levies a
fine and the shareholders sue to try to recover it from the officer who supervised and approved the decision, should she not be able to establish good faith
for business judgment purposes? Meaning, should she not be able to demonstrate that as between herself and the corporation there can be no liability for
the loss, so long as she authorized the acts constituting the violation in a good
faith attempt to rationally calculate the costs and benefits of certain compliance
and alternative courses of action that involved degrees of risk of violation of
the legal command. If your answer is yes to this question, as I think mine
would be, then you might evaluate Professor DeMott’s suggestion positively, as
I do.
32. See id. at 40-43, 52-53, 59-61.
33. See id. at 63-65.
34. See id.
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Were Professor DeMott’s suggestion adopted, I doubt that it would have an
impact on the outcome of cases, but it very well might have a substantial signaling and risk-enhancing effect on the way directors behave. Whether you
think that is good policy or not again depends on whether you prefer corporations to run little or no risk of rule violation (complete deterrence) or whether
you suppose that the general good would more likely be advanced if managers
are permitted to make some judgments about reasonable compliance (fitted or
optimal deterrence). I suppose that, in all events, a rational system would have
the corporation pay an appropriate fine if it happens that its production processes violate a rule, but would impose no derivative liability on directors so
long as they had no direct financial interest and made an informed, good faith
judgment concerning an appropriate compliance effort.
IV
CONCLUSION
It is this dichotomy between complete deterrence and optimal deterrence
that is a core concern of policy. How close to complete deterrence or how close
to optimal deterrence will our policy in any area get us? If we are at all concerned about over-deterrence, we must be very sensitive to the impact that a
rule making corporate officers personally liable for wrong decisions would
have. Of course intuitively many of us will not be especially concerned about
over-deterrence. Many of us tend to be more concerned about what we see—
violations—than what we cannot see—opportunity losses. Thus, politically or
socially, we tend to be concerned about deterrence, not over-deterrence. But
our welfare as a people requires us to be concerned about opportunity losses
that enforcement of legal rules can impose. The Delaware corporation law,
correctly understood, powerfully protects that interest by its implicit concern
with over-deterrence. That is what the business judgment rule is all about.

